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A Life Worth Giving? The Threshold for
Permissible Withdrawal of Life Support
From Disabled Newborn Infants
Dominic James Wilkinson, Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics, University of Oxford
When is it permissible to allow a newborn infant to die on the basis of their future quality of life? The prevailing ofﬁcial view is that treatment may be withdrawn only if
the burdens in an infant’s future life outweigh the beneﬁts. In this paper I outline and defend an alternative view. On the Threshold View, treatment mayb ew i t h d r a w n
from infants if their future well-being is below a threshold that is close to, but above the zero-point of well-being. I present four arguments in favor of the Threshold
View, and identify and respond to several counterarguments. I conclude that it is justiﬁable in some circumstances for parents and doctors to decide to allow an infant
to die even though the infant’s life would be worth living. The Threshold View provides a justiﬁcation for treatment decisions that is more consistent, more robust, and
potentially more practical than the standard view.
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2006). There are two different contexts for decisions. Some-
timeslifesupportiswithdrawnfrominfantswhoaredying,
or who have such overwhelming illness that survival is un-
likely. These decisions are largely uncontroversial. At other
timeslifesupportiswithdrawnfrominfantswhomightsur-
vive if all treatment were provided, for example, newborns
with severe birth asphyxia (Case 1), premature infants with
large brain hemorrhages, or infants with serious congenital
abnormalities (e.g., severe spina biﬁda, trisomy 18 or 13). In
such cases, treatment withdrawal is based upon predicted
quality of life and is far more contentious (Verhagen et al.
2009a; Wilkinson 2009).
HENRY was born at 42 weeks gestation. When his mother ar-
rived at the hospital in labor, the fetal heartbeat was found to
be worryingly slow, and an emergency cesarean section was
performed. Henry was born in poor condition and required
extensive resuscitation. He was put on a mechanical ventilator
andtransferredtointensivecare.Hewasﬂoppy,comatose,and
had abnormal electrical patterns on electroencephalogram. At
72 hours of age Henry remained dependent on the breathing
1. Rennie, Hagmann, and Robertson (2007) and Wilkinson (2010a). This case is ﬁctitious but representative of a fairly common situation
in newborn intensive care. It is not unusual for lifesaving treatment to be withdrawn in situations such as this.
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machine, but his condition had stabilized. It appeared likely
that he would survive if intensive care were continued. Mag-
netic resonance imaging of his brain at that time revealed ab-
normal signal in the basal ganglia, and absence of the nor-
mal signal in the internal capsule. His parents were told that
based on his clinical condition and brain scan appearances
Henry had a very high likelihood of developing severe spastic
quadriplegic cerebral palsy with at least moderate cognitive
impairment.1
Case 1: an infant with predicted severe impairment. Is
it permissible to withdraw life support?
When is it permissible to withdraw life support from a
newborn infant like Henry who would otherwise survive?
One frequently encountered answer, at least as found in
ofﬁcial guidelines, is that life support may be withdrawn
only where the newborn’s future is sufﬁciently dire that the
burdens of treatment and of illness outweigh the beneﬁts
(American Academy of Pediatrics 1994; British Medical As-
sociation. 2007, 3; General Medical Council 2006; Tibballs
2007). It would be better for the infant if he were to die
rather than to have life support continued.
Butthereareatleasttwoproblemsforthisview.Theﬁrst
is that it is not clear that all, or even the majority, of infants
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allowed to die in intensive care would have had lives so bad
that they would have been better to have died in infancy.
For example, some infants like Henry survive, albeit with
severe impairments in physical and cognitive abilities. But
it is not clear that their lives are so dreadful that it would
be better for them to die than to continue to live (Case 2).
The parents of such children often do not believe this is the
case.2
MICHAEL is aged 7. He has severe spastic quadriplegic cere-
bral palsy, microcephaly, and epilepsy. He is cortically blind,
andhassevereintellectualdisability.Michaelappearstorecog-
nize the voices of his parents and teachers and responds with
a smile. He also smiles and sometimes laughs in response to
familiar music. Most of the time he does not appear to be in
pain or discomfort. But he is not able to communicate verbally,
nor with the aid of communication tools. He has a specially
ﬁtted wheelchair, but has no control over it. He is fed via a
gastrostomy. Michael was in the newborn intensive care unit
for a month after birth with severe birth asphyxia, and has
hadseveralhospitaladmissionssincethattimewithprolonged




Case 2: a child with severe impairment. Would it have
been better for him if he had died in infancy?
The second problem is that faced with a prognosis like
Henry’s some parents request that life-support be contin-
ued, and doctors often support their request (McHafﬁe and
Fowlie 1996, 205–215; Nufﬁeld Council on Bioethics 2006,
101; Rennie and Leigh 2008; van der Heide et al. 1998;
Whitelaw 1986). But if the burdens of treatment outweigh
the beneﬁts, it seems highly problematic to allow it to con-
tinue. Treatment withdrawal should be obligatory rather
than optional.
There are different ways to respond to these challenges.
We might question whether withdrawal of life support
should be permitted from infants with severe impairment
like Henry. Perhaps we are wrong to let them die? Alterna-
tively, we may revise our judgment about the quality of life
2. There are, to my knowledge, no surveys of such parents, but
the narrative accounts of parents with severely impaired children
conﬁrm this impression (see for example “The Ashley Treatment”
2007; Cogan and Whardall 2008; Nugent et al. 2008; Shefﬁeld 2007;
Wyn 2007; Yorgason 2003). Although it is possible that caregivers
are biased in their assessment, and systematically overemphasize
the positives while underestimating the negatives for the child,
thereisanargumentthatbioethicistsshouldnotdiscounttheviews
of disabled people (and by extension their caregivers) (Goering
2008). In my experience at least, if such children require short-term
treatment for life-threatening illnesses, it is usually provided.
3. This case, too, is completely ﬁctional. But it describes the con-
dition of many children whom I have cared for. As will become
clear, I do not claim that Michael should now be allowed to die. In
fact, I believe that we should provide him with life-saving medical
treatments as long as they do not cause him prolonged suffering.
But the key question is whether it would have been permissible for
Michael to be allowed to die in infancy.
of surviving children like Michael with severe impairment.
They would have been better to die in infancy. Perhaps we
are wrong to continue life support? But there is another
possible response. Where a critically ill newborn infant is
predicted to have severe and irremediable impairment, such that
they will not be able to take part in and realize many of the good
features of life, it is permissible for parents and doctors either
to allow them to die or to continue treatment. This may be
the case even if it is likely that the child would have some
overall beneﬁt from life.
In this paper I set out and defend such a view. I fo-
cus on the practical policy question: In what circumstances
should we permit parents and doctors to allow an impaired
newborn infant to die?4 I start by relating the concept of
a life worth living to future well-being, and point out an
analogy with debates about “wrongful life” in conception
decisions. I deﬁne two opposing views of the permissibil-
ity of treatment withdrawal: the Zero Line View, and the
Threshold View. I outline four arguments in favor of the
Threshold View and explore several challenges, including
therelationshipbetweenthoseargumentsandmoralstatus.
My aim here is to argue in favor of a revised concep-
tual framework for decisions, not to set out in detail when
treatment withdrawal should be permitted. However, I will
end by setting out how the Threshold View might work
in practice in newborn intensive care. The Threshold View
would not necessarily lead to major changes in end-of-life
care for newborns. But it would provide a better rationale
for decision making in a number of important ways.
WELL-BEING AND A LIFE WORTH LIVING
Decisions about life support in newborn infants are based,
inextricably, on predictions of future well-being, i.e., how
well that individual’s life is likely to go. There are various
theories of well-being (Parﬁt 1984, 493–502; DeGrazia 1995;
Grifﬁn 1986, 7–74), but broadly there are three possibilities
for a newborn:
A life worth living (LWL): A life in which future beneﬁts for
the individual outweigh burdens. There is positive net
future well-being (Buchanan et al. 2000, 224; Garrard
and Wilkinson 2006, 485).
Alifenotworthliving(LNWL):Alifeinwhichfutureburdens
for the individual outweigh beneﬁts. There is negative
net future well-being.
The zero point: A life in which future beneﬁts for the individ-
ual are equal to burdens.5
4. I restrict discussion to the issue of withdrawal of or withholding
treatment in newborns. These arguments should not be taken to
have direct implications for debates about whether or when it is
permissible to actively end the life of a newborn, for example, as al-
lowed in the Netherlands under the Groningen protocol (Verhagen
and Sauer 2005). If it is ever permissible to euthanize a newborn in-
fant,thethresholdforpermissibilitymightbesigniﬁcantlydifferent
from that articulated here.
5. The zero point is a philosopher’s abstraction (Glover 2006, 57).
But it represents a useful way of conceptualizing decisions about
life and death. Some people reject the idea of a zero point because
February, Volume 11, Number 2, 2011 ajob 21The American Journal of Bioethics
The concept of a life worth living is controversial and
sometimes confusing (Garrard and Wilkinson 2006, 485),
and there are several competing meanings. There is an in-
ternal sense to a life worth living: Life is of sufﬁcient value
for the individual concerned to be worthwhile. This should
not be confused with an external sense of the worth of a life,
and its value to others (Buchanan and Brock 1986, 74). A
second distinction is between the level of a life worth starting
(for an individual who does not yet exist) and the level of
a life worth continuing (for an existing individual) (Benatar
2006, 22–23). It is also possible to distinguish two ways of
determining whether a life is above or below the zero point.
There is an objective sense wherein we impartially balance
the intrinsically good states against the bad in an individ-
ual’slife.Andthereisthesubjectivejudgmentoftheindivid-
ual that life’s positives outweigh the negatives and that it is
worthwhile continuing to live (McMahan 1998, 226–228).
I use LWL to refer exclusively to the internal sense of
a life worth continuing. The arguments that follow apply
equally to subjective or objective senses of a LWL.
TWO VIEWS ABOUT THE PERMISSIBILITY
OF CONCEPTION
The concept of an LWL has been central to some debates
about artiﬁcial reproduction and conception decisions. Is
it permissible for parents to deliberately implant an em-
bryo that will have signiﬁcant impairment or illness (e.g.,
deafness)? One view, as expressed by John Harris, is that
it would be permissible as long as the child’s future well-
being were predicted to be above the zero point (Harris
2000). The child has not been harmed since he or she has
an LWL and since the child would not otherwise exist. This
has been referred to as a “zero line view.”6
But this view conﬂicts with commonsense morality as
expressed by Bonnie Steinbock:
It’s ... a question of whether to create a child who is likely to
havealifemarkedbypainandseverelimitations.... Whatrea-
son could be offered in justiﬁcation of an afﬁrmative answer?
That the child’s life, while miserable, is not so awful that he or
she will long for death? That is not the kind of answer a loving
parent could give. (Steinbock and McClamrock 1994, 18)
Steinbock and several other philosophers have rejected
a zero line view for conception decisions (Archard 2004;
Kavka 1982; Steinbock and McClamrock 1994). They have
argued that instead of the zero point of net well-being, a
higher standard should be applied. It is not permissible to
undertake artiﬁcial reproduction unless the child will have
at least a minimum level of well-being—the child’s life will
be above a certain threshold.
they deny that the negatives of life can ever outweigh the positives
(Garrard and Wilkinson 2006, 486; Wyatt 2005). Others may reject
it on the grounds of incommensurability. I assume in what follows
that there is a zero point of well-being even if it is hard to identify.
6. Glover (2006, 53). A zero line view is one that draws a normative
distinction at the zero point.
Figure 1. The permissibility of treatment withdrawal
from newborn infants based upon predicted future
well-being.
TWO VIEWS ABOUT TREATMENT WITHDRAWAL
AND NEWBORN INFANTS
The setting for treatment withdrawal decisions is
different—the judgment is inverted, but a view that par-
allels the Harris’s view of permissible conception is:
The Zero Line View: Life support may be withdrawn from
a newborn infant i fa n do n l yi ffuture burdens for the
individual outweigh beneﬁts, i.e., they are predicted to
have a life not worth living.
TheZeroLineViewoverlapswithanothercommonway
of expressing the permissibility of treatment withdrawal in
newborns. This is the view that treatment may be with-
drawn only if it would be in the best interests of the infant
to die. Many writers when referring to best interests appear
to be using a version of the Zero Line View (Arras 1984;
Hope 2004, 50; Nufﬁeld Council on Bioethics 2006, xxiii,
12; President’s Commission 1983, 218; Sayeed 2006; Tibballs
2007).7
There is a second view about treatment withdrawal that
is analogous to the Steinbock view about conception:
The Threshold View: Life support may be withdrawn from a
newborn infant if and only if their net future well-being
fallsbelowacertainminimumthreshold.Thisthreshold
is above the zero point of a life worth living.
These two views are summarized in Figure 1, which
uses the following additional concepts.
Restricted life: A life in which net well-being is above the
zero point but below the threshold (Kavka 1982, 103).
The threshold: A positive (supra-zero) level of net well-being
deﬁning the upper border of permissibility of treatment
withdrawal. It is obligatory to continue life support for
newborns with predicted well-being above this level.
The lower threshold: A negative (below zero) level of net
well-beingdeﬁningthelowerborderofpermissibilityof
7. Whether a best interests judgment necessarily means adopting
this view is a further question that I return to later.
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treatment continuation. It is obligatory to withdraw life
support for newborns with predicted well-being below
this level.
TherearethreekeyfeaturesoftheThresholdView.First,
it explicitly permits allowing newborn infants to die who
are predicted to have lives worth living. Second, below the
threshold, treatment may be permissibly withdrawn or may
becontinued.Finally,inFigure1,alowerthresholdmarksthe
point at which treatment may not be continued even if par-
ents request it. I focus mostly on the (upper) threshold. The
arguments that follow provide reasons why the threshold
should be above the zero point. However, they also provide
reasons why the lower threshold should be below the zero
point.
The preceding view has some similarities to a classiﬁca-
tionoftreatmentforextremelyprematureinfantselaborated
byTysonandcolleaguesandbyJohnParis(Tysonetal.1996;
Paris et al. 2007). The upper threshold would correspond
to the point at which treatment becomes “mandatory,” the
lower thresholdcorresponds to the point of “unreasonable”
treatment. Between the two thresholds treatment is “op-




I return later to where the threshold might be drawn. It
may help for what follows, however, to give some idea of
the conditions that would potentially fall below the thresh-
old but above the zero point (i.e., restricted lives). I de-
scribedearlierMichael(Case2).Hiscognitive,physical,and
sensory impairments fundamentally diminish his ability to
communicate,interact,anddevelopgoals.Hiswell-beingis
restricted by his impairments in ways that cannot be over-
come no matter how much support his parents or society
provide to him. Other conditions in this category might in-
clude spinal muscular atrophy (type 1) or trisomy 18. For
infants with these conditions, treatment may be continued
or may be withdrawn.
ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF THE THRESHOLD VIEW
The Argument From Uncertainty
Uncertainty is common in newborn intensive care. Prog-
nostic uncertainty arises from a number of factors includ-
ing plasticity of the developing brain, individual resilience,
8. Other writers discussing treatment withdrawal for newborn
infants have also articulated views with some similarity to the
Threshold View. They have argued that it may be permissible to
allow newborns to die who lack certain key capacities (for exam-
ple, the capacity to develop relationships, or to engage in minimal
social interaction), or whose lives are not going to be meaningful
(Arras 1984; Doyal and Durbin 1998; Engelhardt 1978; Kohl 1978;
McCormick 1974). These authors do not talk explicitly about well-
being and whether such lives would be worth living. They are also
somewhat unclear about whether it would be permissible to con-
tinue life support for an infant lacking those key capacities. For
similarities between the Threshold view and the “gray zone” for
treatment decisions see later discussion in this article.
the inﬂuence of the environment and treatment, and limi-
tations in clinical assessment and prognostic tests (Shevell
etal.1999).Thereisfurtheruncertaintyaboutfutureexperi-
ences, particularly of individuals with signiﬁcant cognitive
impairment. For example, even if we knew the exact de-
gree of future impairment we would remain unsure of how
much pain or pleasure the child would experience. This ex-
periential uncertainty makes it difﬁcult to know whether life
would be above or below the zero point.
There are two ways in which uncertainty may justify
the threshold.
Uncertainty and Asymmetry of Harms
In a state of uncertainty, if we choose the zero line as the
cutoff point for treatment withdrawal, it is inevitable that
some infants who survive will actually have lives not worth
living. Imagine, for example, an infant predicted to have fu-
ture net well-being of zero.9 We make this prediction based
upon median well-being in a group of past infants with rel-
evantly similar prognostic features. On the Zero Line View
this is the upper limit of permissible withdrawal. However,
given our uncertainty, this infant has a 50% chance of ac-
tually experiencing well-being above the zero point, and a
50%chanceofwell-beingbelowthispoint.Shouldweweigh
thesepossibilitiesequally?Onereasontorejectthisideaand
adopt a higher threshold is an asymmetry between harms.
Itmaybeaworsemistaketoallowanewborntolivewithan
LNWL than to allow a newborn to die who would have had
an LWL—where the infant would have had a restricted life.
A newborn who survives in a state of such severe im-
pairment and suffering that the child’s life is not worth liv-
ing has been harmed by a decision to prolong his or her life
(Feinberg1986;Benatar2006,20–22;McMahan1998).Onthe
other hand, a newborn who dies but who would have had
an LWL has also been harmed. But these two harms differ
in nature and magnitude. The harm of death for the second
infant lies in being deprived of future well-being (Marquis
1989).Yetthedegreeofthisharmdependsonhowgoodthat
life would have been. If, for example, the child would have
lived a restricted life, the amount of net positive well-being
that the child has lost is potentially small. What is more, the
child was not and is not conscious of this loss. The child
will never be in a position to regret the decision that led to
his or her death. On the other hand, the harm of life for the
child with an LNWL is experienced and may be regretted.
Indeed, many would consider this one of the most serious
harms imaginable.
Asymmetrical harms in conception decisions have been
discussed previously (McMahan 2009). Although it is gen-
erallyacceptedthatanindividualcanbeharmedbycoming
into existence, there is no individual who is harmed if an indi-
vidual (who would have had an LWL) is not conceived.
This asymmetry is related to that problem, but it is different
in one important way. There is an individual existing (the
9. Set aside for the moment the doubts that we may have about
quantifying well-being or about determining the zero point.
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newborn) to whom harm could be attributed if the new-
born dies. However, the nature of that harm is attenuated
because of this newborn’s limited awareness.
There are different possible versions of the asymmetry
argument. I do not claim that there is no harm to an infant
whoisallowedtodie(butwouldhavehadanLWL).Nordo
IclaimthatanyriskofanLNWLoutweighstheriskofallow-
ing an infant to die with an LWL. That would potentially
warrant treatment limitation in any situation where there
is the possibility of survival in a harmed state. There is,
however, widespread intuitive support for at least some de-
gree of asymmetry between harms and beneﬁts (Alm 2009;
Benatar2006,30–36;Kamm2007,17).Mostparentsanddoc-
tors, I suspect, have greater concern for the potential future
harms to infants than for their future beneﬁts. Such concern
is sometimes expressed in the principle of non-maleﬁcence
(Beauchamp and Childress 1999, 120–193). To support the
ThresholdViewIneedonlymakethemoremoderateclaim:
It may be worse to allow an infant to live with an LNWL,
than to allow a newborn to die who would have had a re-
stricted life.10
Uncertainty and Liberalism
Some may reject the asymmetry argument. They may be-
lieve, contrary to the preceding claims, that death for an
infant who would have had an LWL is one of the worst pos-
sible harms (Kon 2008, 28) and that the threshold should
perhaps be below the zero point. But uncertainty provides a
secondargumentinfavoroftheThresholdView.Prognostic
uncertainty and experiential uncertainty make it difﬁcult to
know whether or not an infant will have well-being above
the zero point. There is also signiﬁcant moral uncertainty
about how to evaluate future beneﬁts and burdens. It is un-
clear which theory of well-being we should apply, and how
we should weigh different harms. There is likely to be dis-
agreement about the probability of an LNWL that would be
sufﬁcient to justify allowing a newborn to die.
The problem of moral uncertainty is complicated
(Lockhart 2000) and beyond the scope of this paper. But
one plausible approach to policy in the face of different nor-
mative beliefs is to give individuals the freedom to decide
for themselves which values to apply to their own lives.
This principle is extended to include decisions by parents
on behalf of their children. The state will only interfere with
parental choices where there is a signiﬁcant risk of sub-
stantial harm to the child (Diekema 2004). One response to
decision making for newborn infants would be to give par-
ents the discretion to decide whether or not to continue life
support when there is genuine uncertainty about whether a
child will have a life above or below the zero point. The two
thresholds would mark the boundaries of parental decision
making.
10. Although not expressing it in terms of asymmetrical harms,
Kenneth Kipnis (2007) has also argued that the risk of an LNWL
would justify allowing an infant to die.
Others have made this claim about uncertainty and
parental freedom.11 It has some similarities with the
idea of a “gray zone” for neonatal treatment decisions
(American Academy of Pediatrics Committee on Fetus and
Newborn 2007; Harrison 2008). However, the Threshold
View differs from conventional accounts of the gray zone
in several ways. First, I have argued that this zone will ex-
tend above and below the zero point. The Threshold View
explicitly acknowledges that it may be permissible to with-
draw life support from infants who will probably have lives
abovethezeropoint,whereassomedescriptionsofthegray
zone seem to extend only below the zero point. Second, the
threshold is based upon both prognostic and moral uncer-
tainty. And third, there may be reasons to support a supra-
zerothresholdevenwherethereiscertaintyaboutoutcome.
What if we were certain that an infant would have an
LWL? Imagine an infant with a genetic disorder uniformly
associated with profound cognitive impairment (he will
have the cognitive capacities of a 3-month-old infant). Chil-
dren with this condition usually have good physical health,
and do not suffer from illness or require painful medical
interventions. (Call this the Harmless Case.)12 If there is no
chance of this infant having an LNWL, is it still permissible
to withdraw life-sustaining treatment?13
The Argument From Other Interests
One reason why we may be permitted to withdraw life
support in the hypothetical Harmless Case is because of
the burden of care. Individuals with severe impairment of-
ten need substantial support throughout their lives. Their
care usually falls upon immediate family, often involv-
ing physical, ﬁnancial and emotional burdens. There are
well-documented potential costs for families in psycholog-
ical and physical illness as well as marital discord and
breakup (Barlow and Ellard 2006; Harrison 2008; Mur-
phy et al. 2007; Raina et al. 2005; Reichman et al. 2008;
Macks and Reeve 2007; Williams 1997). The care of in-
dividuals with severe impairments also imposes signiﬁ-
cant costs on society. Their education and health needs are
11. See for example Boyle and colleagues (2004), Diekema (2004),
and Jonas (2007). The 1983 U.S. President’s Commission report
also included a category of “ambiguous or uncertain” treatment
warranting parental discretion in treatment decisions (President’s
Commission 1983, 218–223).
12. The harm here refers to the individual. As is next discussed,
other harms may still be possible.
13. Some may still be tempted in such a case to think that the zero
point is above this level and that perhaps it would be better for
the infant to die in such a case. But there are at least two problems
with such a view. First, we do not generally think that the lives of
3-month-old infants are bad lives. (We may be glad that they subse-
quently develop, especially if we are their sleep-deprived parents,
but that is a separate issue.) Second, such a view would appear
to imply that the lives of many nonhuman animals (with cogni-
tive capacities no greater than a 3-month-old human infant) are
bad, and that it would be better for them to die. This seems highly
implausible.
24 ajob February, Volume 11, Number 2, 2011Withdrawal of Life Support From Disabled Newborns
substantially greater than for children and adults without
such impairments.
On the Zero Line View there is no scope for taking
such factors into account except insofar as they determine
whether or not the child will have an LWL. But in practice
there is a recognition that the interests of parents and of sib-
lings should be given some weight (McHafﬁe and Fowlie
1996,67,73,87;NufﬁeldCouncilonBioethics2006,xvii,17).
Most pediatric and neonatal intensivists appear to incor-
porate family interests into decision making (Hardart and
Truog 2003). Yet if parental or family interests are to have
any role in decisions about withdrawal of treatment, this
would necessarily support the Threshold View. After all, if
these interests could only be taken into account when the
child’s life was below the zero point, they would actually
be playing no role at all in determining the permissibility of
withdrawal of treatment.
When would the interests of others justify allowing an
infant to die? One way of answering this question is by de-
termining when society is prepared to take over the care
of a child. If the future burden of care is sufﬁciently great
that parents are not able or willing to look after the child,
the alternative to allowing the infant to die would be for
her or him to be adopted or put into foster care. In the hy-
pothetical Harmless Case, the infant will certainly have a
life worth living. But supporting the infant involves con-
siderable cost, while providing only a small beneﬁt to the
child. When resources are limited, the provision of lifesav-
ing treatment to an infant with a restricted life may mean
that other children or adults are denied surgery or medi-
cal treatment, or other children with impairment are denied
educational and supportive care. The level of impairment
that a society is able to support will depend upon the re-
sources available. In societies that are very impoverished,
the threshold would potentially be higher than in societies
that have ample resources.
What if there were no costs and no harm? If we imagine
a version of the Harmless Case such that the care of the
child will not cause a burden on parents and will not divert
needed health and educational resources away from others,
there would no longer be a positive reason to allow the
child to die. Correspondingly, we should not permit life
supporttobewithdrawninaHarmlessCostlessCase.Butin
practice such cases will rarely, if ever, occur. Infants who are
predicted to have very severe impairment have a real risk
that their future well-being will fall below the zero point,
and their care substantially affects the interests of others.
These reasons converge to support the Threshold View.
Deontological Arguments for the Threshold
Arguments in favor of a threshold view for conception de-
cisions are based on parental duties or rights. Steinbock
refers to a “principle of parental responsibility” (Steinbock
and McClamrock 1994). David Archard argues that a “min-
imally decent life” provides a constraint on parental repro-
ductiverights(Archard2004).Bothaccountsseektoexplain
whyitwouldbewrongtodeliberatelyconceiveachildwith
a restricted life. But these arguments do not necessarily ex-
tend to treatment withdrawal decisions.
Nevertheless, the threshold could be seen as providing
a constraint to a different duty. Parents and doctors have a
strong prima facie duty to do what they can to preserve the
life of a newborn infant. In the previous section I discussed
the possibility that this duty may be outweighed. But there
may also be limits to it. We are not obliged to keep a child
alive who is dependent on life support and in a permanent
vegetativestate.Alifeofpermanentunconsciousnessoffers
no beneﬁt to the child, and dissolves the normal duty to
preserve life.14 But where a child’s future life is predicted to
contain a very low amount of positive net well-being, the
duty to preserve life may also be signiﬁcantly attenuated or
absent.15 On this basis it would be permissible for parents
and doctors to elect not to preserve the life of a newborn
predicted to have a restricted life.
A complementary way of justifying the Threshold View
would be in terms of the right of parents to make decisions
abouttheirchildren.Formostdecisionsthereisarebuttable
presumptionthatparentshavesucharight(Dare2009).This
might be justiﬁed by parents’ right to autonomy, but also by
the value of preserving intimate family relationships, and
in the avoidance of undue state interference in family life
(Downie and Randall 1997; Schoeman 1985). Again, if such
a right has any relevance for decisions about life-sustaining
treatment,itwouldnecessarilysupporttheThresholdView.
The preceding arguments about the duties or rights of
parents capture an intuitive sense that there is more to such
decisions thantheZeroLineView wouldimply.Forparents
anddoctorstobeobligedtopreservethelifeoftheinfant,or
for society to overrule parents’ right to decide, the infant’s
life must be more than one barely worth living; it must be
above the threshold; it should be a life worth giving.
COUNTERARGUMENTS TO THE THRESHOLD VIEW
The Threshold View will be controversial for some. What
arguments might be presented against it?
The Scope of the Threshold and the Moral Status of
Newborn Infants
I have referred exclusively to newborn treatment decisions.
But there might be a concern that the Threshold View
14. The majority of pediatric intensivists surveyed would limit
treatment in the setting of predicted vegetative state (Devictor et al.
2008). Surveys of patient preferences also suggest that the vast ma-
jority of adults would not want life-sustaining treatment provided
if they were in a vegetative state (Emanuel et al. 1991). While the
2004 statement by Pope John Paul II maintained that patients in a
vegetative state retain a right to certain basic treatments, includ-
ing artiﬁcial nutrition and hydration (Pope John 2004), the Catholic
church has long held that the duty to preserve life is relative rather
than absolute (Clark 2006). For patients in a vegetative state, me-
chanical ventilation and intensive care would usually be regarded
as extraordinary means and therefore not obligatory (Clark 2006).
15. A version of this argument is expressed by John Arras: “In
the absence of certain distinctly human capacities ... the duty to
sustain life loses its hold on caregivers” (Arras 1984, 32).
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would justify the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment
from older children or adults with LWL. Alternatively, it
could be argued that the Threshold View should be resisted
since it permits different standards for treatment decisions,
and by inference, different moral status for newborn infants
(Janvier et al. 2007).
A full discussion of the moral status of newborn infants
isbeyondthescopeofthispaper.Butifthethresholdistoap-
ply to newborn infants and not to older patients it must im-
ply that they warrant different moral consideration.16 There
are several reasons that would support such a view. First,
a newborn’s interest in her or his future well-being may be
diminished by her or his reduced awareness of her- or him-
self, and of that future (McMahan 2002, 170). This affects
how that interest should be weighed against other interests
and other considerations and gives rise to the asymmetry
in harms noted earlier. Second, there is greater uncertainty
fornewborntreatmentdecisionsthanforolderchildrenand
adults.17Thisarisesfromthegreaterdegreeofplasticityand
thus variability in response to injury (Stiles 2000) and from
their greater developmental immaturity, making clinical as-
sessment difﬁcult (Shevell et al. 1999). It gives more weight
to the arguments from uncertainty.18 Third, there is often a
long period of time before the extent of an infant’s impair-
ment is known. By the time that it is clear that he or she is
destined for an LNWL, an infant may no longer be depen-
dentuponlife-sustainingtreatment.Prolongedsurvivalina
harmedstateispossible.Thesethreereasonswouldnotusu-
ally apply, or would apply less forcefully, for older children
or adults.19 It would be appropriate to use the zero line for
determining the permissibility of withdrawal of treatment
outside the newborn period.
What is the relationship between well-being and moral
status? It is not that future low levels of well-being make an
individual less worthy of moral consideration. Rather, the
moral status of an individual determines how we should
take into account the well-being in that person’s future and
whether it is obligatory to preserve their life. The moral sta-
tusofanadultwouldremainunchangedfollowingapredic-
tion that the adult’s future contains only a very slight pos-
16. Moral status is sometimes discussed as if it were an all-or-none
phenomenon, as evidenced by the question “does X have moral
status?” But it arguably makes more sense for moral consideration
to admit of degree, and for the appropriate question to be “what




appears likely to be the case.
18. Some may reject the arguments from uncertainty. They may
believe, for example, that treatment withdrawalis only permissible
where there is a very high degree of certainty about prognosis. If
this were the case, greater uncertainty about outcome for newborn
infants would potentially warrant less parental discretion. (I am
grateful to an anonymous reviewer for this point.)
19. I set aside here the question of whether a supra-zero threshold
should be applied to decisions about life support for older indi-
viduals whose awareness of themselves and of their future is no
greater than newborns.
itive balance of well-being or even net negative well-being
(though this would potentially have major implications for
their treatment). Similarly, a newborn’s moral status is not
altered by predicted future impairment. However, in new-
born infants it is legitimate to use a different well-being
threshold for deciding whether or not to continue to keep
them alive.
The other question about the scope of the Threshold
View is about the period during which it should be applied.
One approach might be to limit it to the ﬁrst month of life
(or to 1 month corrected age for infants born prematurely).
Such a time limit would be in one sense arbitrary, but also
defensible. I return in the following to the question of arbi-
trariness and the Threshold View.
The Threshold and Discrimination
It may be objected that the Threshold View represents a
form of discrimination against disabled infants.
However, the justiﬁcation for treatment withdrawal on
the Threshold View is based on future well-being, not on
disability or impairment. If an infant were predicted to be
impaired, but to have future well-being signiﬁcantly above
the zero point, it would not be permissible to allow them
to die. The Threshold View would also, in theory, permit
treatment withdrawal from an infant who did not have a
physical or cognitive impairment, but who was predicted
to have levels of well-being only just above the zero point.20
In practice, the majority of infants with restricted lives
would be infants with predicted impairment. Yet it does
not follow that this represents a form of wrongful discrim-
ination (Arneson 2006). Treatment withdrawal on the Zero
Line View is not thought to be discriminatory even though
it largely affects impaired infants. Future impairments do
not change the moral status of an individual. The question
is whether they affect well-being. Some types of impair-
ment, for example, severe cognitive impairment, necessar-
ily reduce the amount of well-being in an infant’s future life
(Kahane and Savulescu 2009). Other impairments only con-
tingently reduce well-being, depending upon the support
provided to the impaired individual and the social context
in which they live. Such impairments would not, in my
view, justify withdrawal of life support.
Arbitrariness of the Threshold
One potential concern with the Threshold View is that there
is no nonarbitrary way of arriving at a threshold.21
There are, however, different senses of arbitrariness. A
cutoff point may be arbitrary in the sense that it could be
defensiblydrawnatadifferentlevel.Oritcouldbearbitrary
20. For example, imagine an infant with a very limited life ex-
pectancy (for example, a matter of days), but who appears to be
suffering little, if at all. Their brief future life may well contain a
positive balance of well-being. If so, the Zero Line View would ap-
pear to mandate that treatment continue. On the Threshold View,
however, it would not be obligatory to continue life support.
21. A similar objection has been raised against threshold views for
conception decisions (Garrard and Wilkinson 2006).
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in the sense that there is no reason to make the distinction. A
lawthatallowspeopletoapplyforadrivinglicenseafterthe
ageof18yearsisarbitraryintheﬁrstsense.Butthereisgood
reason to draw a line somewhere, and a number of reasons
whyapointinthelateteenageyearsisanappropriateplace.
It is not arbitrary in the second sense. Similarly, there are
multiple plausible places to draw a threshold for treatment
withdrawal, but a number of reasons (outlined earlier) why
the threshold should be set above the zero point.
Second, a decision, on the basis of the Zero Line View,
that a newborn should or should not be allowed to die may
also be criticized on the grounds of arbitrariness. There is
profound uncertainty about how to deﬁne the zero point
andsubstantialprognosticuncertaintyaboutwhetherornot
an infant will fall above or below it. Furthermore, it is sim-
ply unclear, on the Zero Line View, what level of certainty
(that an infant will live an LNWL) would justify treatment
withdrawal.
Third, even if the threshold is arbitrary, there is a fur-
ther question about whether this should lead us reject the
Threshold View. Given the important practical need to
determine whether or not treatment withdrawal is permis-
sible, and the reasons that I have outlined in favor of a
supra-zero threshold, it may be that the disadvantages of
greater arbitrariness are outweighed by the other advan-
tages of the Threshold View.
The Best Interests of the Infant
Another potential objection to the Threshold View is that it
wouldbecontrarytothebestinterestsoftheinfanttopermit
withdrawal of treatment if the individual were predicted to
have an LWL.
If the objection is that the Threshold View would be
contrary to the legal best interests principle, it may have
some traction. Previous legal judgments about withdrawal
of life support (at least in the United Kingdom) have often
used the concept of “intolerability,” which appears to be a
stringent subjective version of the Zero Line View.22 But the
argumentshereareaboutwhatpolicyshouldbe—notabout
what is currently permitted.
Alternatively, the objection might be that the Thresh-
old View is inconsistent with the ethical principle of the best
interestsofthechild.Ifthebestinterestsprincipleisequiva-
lent to the Zero Line View, the Threshold View will diverge
from best interests. But if that is the case, the arguments
given earlier provide reasons for either rejecting or mod-
ifying the best interests principle for newborn treatment
decisions.
The Threshold View may also be consistent with the
best interests principle. I discussed the asymmetry between
harms.Butwecouldalsoexpressthisintermsofthebalance
between a newborn’s interest in not living an LNWL and in
realizing a future LWL. The arguments given earlier would
give us reason to weigh the former interest as potentially
stronger than the latter—particularly where the infant’s fu-
22. See for example Re J ([1991], 55F).
ture well-being is predicted to be low. Furthermore, at least
some descriptions of the best interests standard allow a role
for taking into account the interests of others (Kopelman
2007)inawaythatsupportsasupra-zerothreshold.Itcould
be in an infant’s best interests to be allowed to die, though
the infant is predicted to have an LWL.
WELL-BEING AND WITHDRAWAL: IMPLICATIONS OF
THE THRESHOLD FOR TREATMENT DECISIONS
The aim of this paper has been to defend an alternative
framework for treatment withdrawal decisions, not to set
out a particular cutoff point. But how could we arrive at
a substantive deﬁnition of the threshold, and what would
the implications be for treatment decisions? A full answer
would need to draw on an account of well-being (Crisp
2006; Kraut 2007; Sumner 1996) and on empirical data on
conditions and their effect on well-being, and ideally seek
consensusaboutthoseconditionswhereparentaldiscretion
in treatment decisions is reasonable. Here I can only hope
to make a preliminary suggestion.
The preceding arguments may prove useful in set-
ting out the necessary and sufﬁcient conditions (C) for the
thresholds, as follows.
Normative Criteria for the Threshold
Treatment withdrawal is permissible for infants with con-
ditions that:
• C1. Reduce future well-being, either by reducing beneﬁts
or by imposing substantial burdens on the child (or both)
AND
• C2. Are close to the level of an LNWL, AND EITHER
• C3. Involve a signiﬁcant risk of an LNWL OR
• C4. Impose a substantial burden of care on others.
Normative Criteria for the Lower Threshold
Treatment continuation is not permissible for infants with
conditions that:
• C1. Reduce future well-being, either by reducing beneﬁts
or by imposing substantial burdens on the child (or both)
AND
• C5. Render it highly likely that the infant will have an
LNWL and be harmed by continuing treatment.
Practical Criteria
What is a “signiﬁcant” risk, or a “substantial” burden of
care? Which conditions are close to the level of an LNWL?
If the Threshold View were adopted it would be impor-
tant to provide clinicians and parents with some idea of the
sorts of conditions that would fall into the different nor-
mative categories that I have described. Figure 2 represents
an attempt to apply the Threshold View to prognostication
in birth asphyxia, the condition that affected Henry and
Michael.
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Figure 2. The Threshold View and predicted impairment
in birth asphyxia.
In Figure 2 I have drawn the threshold at the level
of severe cognitive impairment23 or very severe physical
impairment.24 Why choose this level? Children with mod-
erate physical impairment are usually able to walk with
assistive mobility devices (Himmelmann et al. 2006), while
individualswithmoderatecognitiveimpairment(IQ35–50)
are usually socially interactive and able to communicate at
least to the level of basic needs, and often can carry on
simple conversations (Harris 2006, 54). Both types of im-
pairment would be consistent with a broad range of goods
on either subjective or objective theories of well-being. It is
not usually thought that such individuals have an LNWL,
nor that there is a signiﬁcant risk of this befalling them.
In contrast, for individuals with very severe physical
impairment or with severe cognitive impairment it is more
questionable whether their lives fall above the zero point,
andmorereasonabletoworrythattheymayhaveanLNWL.
It is for infants with this level of impairment that there is
most debate about whether or not treatment is in their best
interests. Although Henry may be expected to have a life
that is worth living, there is a risk that his impairments will
bemoreseverethananticipated,orthatothermedicalprob-
lems arise. It is also for such infants, particularly those with
severe cognitive impairment, that the beneﬁts of life appear
clearly diminished (McMahan 2009; Wilkinson 2006).
I have not indicated a speciﬁc statistical threshold, but
the arguments from uncertainty would suggest that it is
reasonable to give weight to at least modest chances of
signiﬁcant harms. Is it possible to be more speciﬁc? One
way of capturing this idea without using speciﬁc numerical
thresholds would be by borrowing the language of the law.
Civil cases are often settled on the basis of the balance of
23. A standard deﬁnition of severe cognitive impairment includes
an intelligence quotient (IQ) of 20–35. Individuals with this level of
impairmentusuallyalsohaveimpairmentofmotorskills,difﬁculty
in ambulation, and limited communication ability. Most require
close supervision and care throughout life (Harris 2006; King et al.
2000).
24. I use very severe physical impairment to refer to severe
quadriplegia with a Gross Motor Functional Classiﬁcation System
level 5 or equivalent (self-mobility is severely limited even with
assistive devices) (Wake et al. 2003; Palisano et al. 1997).
probabilities, while criminal conviction is usually required to
establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt (Murphy 2007, 111).
The latter is unsatisfactory for the threshold, since there is
always some doubt about prognosis. Stipulating the for-
mer would permit treatment withdrawal in infants with a
slightly less than 50% chance of survival without severe im-
pairment, which may give too great a weight to survival
with a restricted life. In the absence of a better standard, I
suggest that it would be permissible to withdraw treatment
if there is clear and convincing evidence that an infant will
have severe impairments as described earlier.25 Similarly, if
there is clear and convincing evidence that continuing treat-
ment would harm an infant, it should not be provided even
if parents request it.
The idea that life support may be permissibly with-
drawn from newborn infants who are predicted to have
lives worth living may seem striking, even shocking to
some. But in fact this proposal is not a radical suggestion.
The Threshold View as I have outlined it is broadly con-
sistent with current practice in many neonatal units. On
the basis of the guideline outlined earlier, it would be per-
missible to withdraw life support from newborn infants
with predicted severe cognitive deﬁcits, including infants
like Henry who have had severe hypoxic ischemic brain in-
jury, congenital brain malformations such as lissencephaly,
or infants with trisomy 13 or 18. It would also potentially
include infants with overwhelming physical impairments
such as spastic quadriplegic cerebral palsy, severe spina bi-
ﬁda,orspinalmuscularatrophy. 26Itwouldnotpermitwith-
drawal of life support from infants with Down syndrome27
or milder forms of spina biﬁda.
However,oneadvantageoftheThresholdViewisthatit
does not commit us to saying that the lives of children with
the severe impairments outlined earlier (e.g., Michael) are
notworthliving.UnliketheZeroLineView,itdoesnotcom-
mit us to the judgment that if parents refuse to allow with-
drawaloflifesupportfromtheinfant,they,andbyextension
any doctors who go along with their request, are harming
the infants. It is consistent with the approach adopted cur-
rently in many neonatal units. In cases like those described
here, doctors do not force parents to agree to withdrawal
of life support. In my experience they often do not even
try to persuade parents that treatment should be withdrawn.
On the contrary, withdrawal of life support is offered to
parents as an alternative that they may choose to embrace
25. The clear and convincing evidence standard is used in
some American legal cases, and indicates a high degree of
probability—more than 50%, but less stringent than beyond reason-
able doubt (Murphy 2007, 111).
26. Although I have focussed on infants with predicted impair-
ments, the Threshold View might also include infants born at the
borderline of viability (for example, the Messenger case, or the case
of Miller v. HCA), where a signiﬁcant risk of dying, or of survival
with severe impairment is often taken to permit parental discretion
about resuscitation (American Academy of Pediatrics Committee
on Fetus and Newborn 2007).
27. For example, the U.S. Bloomington Baby Doe case, or the UK
case of “B” (Paris 2007; Ahluwahlia et al. 2007).
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(Wilkinson 2010b). With rare exceptions, doctors usually
comply with parental requests to continue life support.28
There are two other advantages of the Threshold View
over the Zero Line View. The Threshold View potentially
provides more practical assistance with decision making
than the Zero Line View. The problems with determining
exactly where the zero point lies raise serious challenges
about how to apply the Zero Line View in practice. How
severe does impairment have to be to make an LNWL?
What probability of severe impairment would warrant a
judgment, based on the zero line, that treatment should be
withdrawn? On the other hand, if we adopted the Thresh-
old View it might be possible to generate far more speciﬁc
anddetailedguidelinesaboutthetypesofconditionswhere
parental discretion would be permitted, and those where it
would not. Figure 2 represents an attempt to do this for
birth asphyxia. If such guidelines could be generated, the
Threshold View would have the potential to lead to more
consistent decision making between doctors and between
hospitals.
CONCLUSION
A decision to allow a newborn to die is one that no doctor
or parent takes lightly. But such decisions are a regular part
of work in newborn intensive care. The prevailing view of
the permissibility of withdrawal of life support (at least as
expressed in written guidelines for decisions) is one that I
have here labeled the Zero Line View—treatment may be
withdrawn only where an infant is predicted to have a life
not worth living. I have outlined and defended an alterna-
tive to that view. On the Threshold View it is not obligatory
to continue life support for infants who will have very low
levels of well-being. Recall the infant Henry described at
the start of this paper. It is simply unclear whether or not
his future life will be so bad that it would be better for him
to die than to live. I have not argued that treatment should
be withdrawn in such cases. Henry may turn out to have
a life worth living. We should permit Henry’s parents to
decide to continue treatment. If they do choose continued
treatment, we should support them as much as possible
to maximize the well-being for their child. But we can be
reasonably certain that if Henry survives, his capacity to
experience the goods of life will be severely constrained.
To keep Henry alive risks a very serious harm—that of be-
ing harmed by life. Treatment will impose serious burdens
on Henry’s family while yielding relatively little beneﬁt to
28. There is little data on conﬂicts in end-of-life decision mak-
ing in newborn infants, but this may vary between cultures. In
one recent study from the Netherlands, doctors agreed to continue
treatmentinallcaseswhereparentsopposedtreatmentwithdrawal
(Verhagen et al. 2009b). From an earlier survey of neonatologists it
was estimated that in 20–25 infants per year in the Netherlands
treatment was not withdrawn because parents refused consent for
this (van der Heide et al. 1998). In a comparative qualitative study
in U.S. neonatal units treatment was continued in all cases where
parents declined treatment withdrawal (Orfali 2004). However, in
French neonatal units decisions about treatment were made by
medical staff and conveyed to parents (Orfali 2004).
Henry. His parents have a right to decide about treatment
given reasonable disagreement about how to weigh the risk
of an LNWL and because they will ultimately bear the costs
of that choice.
The Threshold View, as I have outlined it, would not
necessarily lead to a radical change in practice in newborn
intensive care. It would not lead to withdrawal of life sup-
port from infants with a reasonable chance of a good life.
It accords with a sense (that I suspect many parents and
neonatologists share) that for us to be obligated to save a
life it must not only be a life worth living, it must also be a
lifeworthgiving.Thereisfurtherworktobedoneinorderfor
such a view to be translated into practical guidelines. But I
have argued here that such a view is superior to the stan-
dard way of thinking about these decisions in a number of
important ways. The Threshold View provides a more con-
sistent,morerobust,andpotentiallymorepracticalbasisfor
the withdrawal of life support from newborn infants.
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